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reaction is rooted in experience, or rooted in the way a belief can be grounded 
in experience, or rooted in some other way. In a further commentary on the 
storm episode Phillips says that "the notion of God's will is formed, not in 
a search for explanations, but in the abandonment of explanations." When in 
such a storm situation one realizes there is an absence of anything to show 
why one should perish or not one comes to a sense of being at Gods mercy 
and, through it, to a sense of wonder at the contingency of life. In this way 
there is a "dying to the understanding." Phillips goes on (pp. 283-89) to 
explore this "dying to the understanding" in a different setting, involving 
one's relation to others. Here he uses to good effect the episode of Mrs. 
Thrpin's revelation, in Flannery O'Connor's short story. 
In these discussions we have Phillips consulting and describing aspects of 
religious life. Here he is doing the "looking" that Wittgenstein recommended, 
and the results are edifying. This is not to say that we should accept his 
descriptions as definitive or, indeed, any of his commentary, nor that we 
should reject it. Descriptions usually have a point and the point can skew 
them, and the lessons drawn from them can be off or just right. These are 
matters for reflection. But the substance of the descriptions remains as nour-
ishment for philosophical reflection. 
On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, by Luis de Molina, 
translated, with an introduction and notes, by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xii and 286. $34.95. 
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College. 
To refer to this volume as Freddoso's "translation" of Molina is correct but 
woefully inadequate. Freddoso's 81-page Introduction is not only a superb 
commentary on the late-medieval controversy over foreknowledge and mid-
dle knowledge; it is also a major philosophical work in its own right. My 
recommendation to the reader is that she begin by reading the first three 
sections of the Introduction (deferring sections 4 and 5) as rapidly as possible 
so as to provide orientation for the sixteenth-century controversy. Then, she 
should carefully work through the translation, finally returning for a leisurely 
re-reading of the entire Introduction for its original philosophical insights. In 
this review I shall comment briefly on the translation, and then more in detail 
on Freddoso's Introduction. 
In his preface, Freddoso notes that the has resisted the temptation to divide 
Molina's very long sentences (a topic of complaint even in the sixteenth 
century!) into shorter ones, because "after several attempts at it, I become 
convinced that I could not do this without altering the sense of the original" 
(p. x). In spite of this, Freddoso has achieved a remarkable clarity in his 
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rendering; I do not recall a single sentence in the translation whose syntax 
and/or intent remained unclear to me. This is due in considerable part, to be 
sure, to the excellent notes, printed by Cornell at the foot of each page where 
they belong. These notes cover everything from explanations (and occasional 
corrections of inaccuracies) of Molina's statements, to brief biographies of 
contemporary writers referred to, to explanations of doctrines Molina is re-
futing. This is not to say, of course, that no obscurities remain. But I think 
the reader can be confident that those which persist are due to genuine diffi-
culties in Molina's thought; to the extent that scholarly background and 
commentary can remove difficulties, Freddoso has done so. 
The full title of the Concordia is The Compatibility of Free Choice with 
the Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination and 
Reprobation. The entirety of Parts I-IV (there are seven Parts in all) is a 
"strikingly extensive commentary, divided into fifty-three disputations, on a 
single article from the First Part of St. Thomas's Summa Theologiae, namely, 
question 14, article 13, 'Whether God Has Knowledge of Future 
Contingents'" (p. x). Indeed, Molina's regard for Thomas, "whom in all 
things I sincerely desire to have as a patron instead of an adversary" (p. 114), 
is the cause of some difficulties, in that Molina is most reluctant to indicate 
a disagreement with Thomas even when it is clear that one exists. Thus, it is 
very evident that Molina's conception of divine eternity differs markedly 
from that of Thomas, yet Molina can never quite bring himself to acknowl-
edge this. 
Part IV, On Divine Foreknowledge, comprises Disputations 47 through 53. 
Disputation 47, "On the Source of Contingency," contains a discussion of 
various forms of contingency, including the argument (which may be of 
interest to animal-rights advocates) that there is in brute beasts a "certain 
trace of freedom" and also of contingency in their movements. In Disputa-
tions 48 and 49 Molina considers and rejects the doctrine, usually attributed 
to Aquinas, that God knows future contingent things by his "direct vision" 
of them in eternity. In Disputations 50 and 51 Molina considers and rejects 
several other contemporary views of foreknowledge. Disputation 52 sets forth 
in detail Molina's theory of scientia media or middle knowledge, and in 
Disputation 53 he deals with objectors, principally the Banezians. (Domingo 
Banez, Molina's principal opponent, held that, in the case of all nonevil 
actions, God efficaciously moves the human agent to take the intended action. 
Molina, no doubt rightly, rejected this as a denial of human freedom.) The 
perusal of these Disputations should result not only in a better appreciation 
of Molina's own views, but in an understanding of the controversial context 
of his debate, which in many respects is markedly different from our own. It 
cannot be unimportant, for instance, that Molina narrowly escaped condem-
nation because of his "excessive" concessions to free will, whereas a great 
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many philosophers today are SUSpICIOUS of his view precisely because it 
comes too close to determinism. 
In his Introduction Freddoso distinguishes the source-question about fore-
knowledge, "[W]hat is the source of and explanation for the fact that God 
knows future contingents with certainty?" from the reconciliation-question, 
"How is this divine foreknowledge to be reconciled with the contingency of 
what is known by itT' (p. 1). Freddoso, following Molina, holds that the 
source-question is answered through the theory of middle knowledge, which 
holds that God knows "conditional future contingents" (better known in re-
cent literature as "counterfactuals of freedom") and that these, together with 
God's knowledge of his own causal contribution, enable God to know the 
actual future. And he also holds, unsurprisingly, that God's knowledge of the 
future is not incompatible with (a moderately strong libertarian conception 
of) human freedom. What cannot be conveyed in a brief review, however, is 
the care and insight embodied in Freddoso's definitions, analyses, and dis-
cussions of these points. 
My own objections to these views are on record and will not be repeated 
here. 1 I do want to point out, however, that on at least two important matters 
Freddoso deviates from the positions usually held by those who otherwise 
share the views stated above. I believe, furthermore, that these deviations (I 
am tempted to call them defections) are significant enough that they ought 
to be a source of concern for those who have a stake in defending those 
views. 
One such deviation concerns the way in which Freddoso arrives at his 
answer to the reconciliation-question. Probably the most popular solution for 
this problem (among those who, like Freddoso, hold that there is a solution) 
is the "Ockhamist" response in terms of "hard and soft facts": facts about 
God's past beliefs are "soft facts" about the past and thus, unlike "hard facts," 
may still be open to our control. Indeed, Freddoso himself has arguably been 
the best exponent of this solution.2 But Freddoso has undergone a "conversion 
from Ockhamism to Molinism" (p. 61), and now holds, with Molina, that 
"God's past beliefs are just as necessary in the sense in question as are any 
other truths about the past," and that "If God knew from eternity that Peter 
would deny Christ at T, then no agent can now cause it to be true that God 
never knew this" (p. 58). 
How then can foreknowledge and freedom be reconciled? The answer is 
best given in Molina's own words: 
Even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because ... these two things cannot 
both obtain, namely, that God foreknows something to be future and that the 
thing does not turn out that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary 
in the sense in question (because it is past-tense and because no shadow of 
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alteration can befall God), nonetheless the consequent can be purely contin-
gent (p. 189, quoted by Freddoso in the Introduction, p. 58). 
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Thus, even though God's eternal knowledge that Peter would deny Christ is 
part of the immutable past, Peter's denial itself is "purely contingent" and is 
"unqualifiedly able to obtain and able not to obtain" (pp. 189, 190). As 
Freddoso well says, "at first glance [Molina's] response to the argument is 
apt to strike one as astonishing" (p. 58). But he now accepts that response, 
and in defense of it he brings forward the well-worn argument that God's 
foreknowledge does not cause Peter's sin (though as Jonathan Edwards long 
ago pointed out, foreknowledge can perfectly well show an action to be 
necessary, even if it is not the foreknowledge that makes it necessary3). 
It should perhaps be said that this Molinist view is slightly less paradoxical 
than it may at first seem. Freddoso and Molina do not deny the logical rule, 
"If D P, and D (P ~ Q), then D Q." In the inference which they reject, the 
first premise (about God's past knowledge of Peter's sin) and the conclusion 
(about Peter's sin itself) are not logically or metaphysically necessary; rather, 
they are necessary in the way "hard facts" about the past are necessary-as 
Freddoso says, "accidentally necessary." So Freddoso is not claiming that 
logical and metaphysical necessity are not closed under entailment-that 
would indeed be nonsense-but rather that accidental necessity is not so 
closed.4 What he denies, then, is what are sometimes called "transfer of 
necessity principles," or what I have elsewhere designated as "power entail-
ment principles."s Nevertheless, at least one reader finds Freddoso's initial 
incredulity a.t Molina's position far more persuasive than his eventual en-
dorsement of it. 
The other deviation concerns the semantics of counterfactuals of freedom 
(or, conditional future contingents). Ever since the reinvention of middle 
knowledge by Alvin Plantinga, expositions of the theory have tended to rely 
on the possible-worlds semantics for counterfactuals developed by Stalnaker, 
Lewis and Pollock. The central idea of this semantics is, that a counterfactual 
conditional is true if its antecedent and consequent are both true in some 
world which is more similar to the actual world than any in which the ante-
cedent is true and the consequent false. This semantics, as many students of 
counterfactuals will agree, is remarkably helpful both in enabling one to grasp 
in a general way the truth-conditions for counterfactuals, and in helping one 
to appreciate the validity or invalidity of particular argument-forms. 
Freddoso, however, has come to recognize that there is a crucial flaw in 
this semantics from the standpoint of middle knowledge. The guiding idea of 
the possible-worlds semantics is that the truth of counterfactuals is deter-
mined by the similarity of various possible worlds in non-counter/actual 
respects; more idiomatically, truths about "what would be the case ... if' de-
pend on truths about what is in fact the case. The theory of middle knowledge, 
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on the other hand, requires that the truth-values of the counterfactuals are not 
dependent on other, non-counterfactual truths about the worlds in question. 
And if the proponent of middle knowledge is thus forced to reject the guiding 
idea of the possible-worlds semantics for counterfactuals, continued reliance 
on that semantics as a logical underpinning for the theory becomes extremely 
dubious. 6 Freddoso says, ~Molinists may have to modify [the standard pos-
sible-worlds semantics] or propose an alternative capable of sustaining real-
ism with respect to conditional future contingents" (pp. 74-75). He has also 
said, ~we might wonder why it wasn't perfectly obvious from the start that 
comparative similarity wouldn't help us if the conditionals in question in-
volve genuine causal indeterminism."' 
It seems to me that Freddoso's repudiation of the possible-worlds semantics 
is a double-edged move. On the one hand, it makes the theory of middle 
knowledge somewhat harder to attack, since it becomes difficult for a critic 
to draw inferences concerning counterfactuals of freedom in any principled 
way. But it also removes a good deal of the philosophical substance from the 
theory, and those who are inclined to be suspicious of counterfactuals (espe-
cially, counterfactuals of freedom) in any case are hardly going to be reas-
sured by being deprived of any systematic account of their semantics. 
Significantly, Freddoso writes ~I freely admit that the positive task of elab-
orating a metaphysical and semantic foundation for this doctrine is enormous 
and has hardly yet begun" (p. 75). 
Valuable as are Freddoso's detailed arguments and analyses, it may be that 
his most important contribution lies in the reintegration of divine foreknowl-
edge into a broader theological context-an integration which was taken for 
granted in traditional theology, but has largely been neglected in recent phi-
losophy. In order to conserve space, I shall limit myself to commenting on 
the single most important point, the connection between foreknowledge and 
divine providence. ~[B]elief in divine foreknowledge," Freddoso tells us, ~is 
not in itself a foundational tenet of classical Western theism. Instead, it 
derives its lofty theological status from its intimate connection with the ab-
solutely central doctrine that God is perfectly provident" (p. 2). Perfect prov-
idence, in turn, means that 
God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, and provides for 
all the effects that constitute His artifact, the created universe with its entire 
history, and executes His chosen plan by playing an active causal role suffi-
cient to ensure its exact realization. Since God is the perfect artisan, not even 
the most trivial details escape His providential decrees. Thus, whatever oc-
curs is properly said to be specifically decreed by God ... (p. 3) 
The apparently damaging implications with regard to evil are turned away 
by the claim (dubiously coherent, in my view) that God intends only the good 
actions which are part of his plan, and merely permits those which are evil. 
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What is important in the present context, however, is that simple foreknowl-
edge, foreknowledge without middle knowledge, is not sufficient to enable 
God to be perfectly provident. Indeed, I claim to have shown that simple 
foreknowledge is of no use whatever for the doctrine of providence.8 Simple 
foreknowledge provides God with knowledge of what will actually occur, 
but this knowledge, which is subsequent to God's own decision about what 
he will himself do, cannot then be used to guide that decision. And thus we 
obtain an important result: Those who wish to combine a libertarian concep-
tion of free will with a strong doctrine of providence must embrace middle 
knowledge. Those who affirm simple foreknowledge but deny middle knowl-
edge are very likely to find themselves with a doctrine of foreknowledge 
which is theologically useless. 
Freddoso's work on Molina is indispensable. It is an outstanding contribu-
tion to the literature on divine foreknowledge, and by far the best thing 
produced to date on middle knowledge. Those who work on either of these 
topics will overlook it to their own great loss. 
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DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame. 
In a challenging and penetrating inquiry, this philosopher from Aberdeen 
develops a sustained argument whereby the world in which we live assumes 
its rightfully primary place, and it is this world's continuing into the future 
